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The face-to-face
battlefield changed more in the four years of WW1 than in the previous four
thousand. Before, a successful defensive
move was to “close ranks” to repel or break cohesion of that group whose ranks were
not close enough. Once an attacker
breaches the front ranks of a defending unit, even one very small, weakens the
ability of the defenders to close ranks,
present a united front, shoulder to shoulder.
The enemy has the opportunity to attack defenders from more than one
side. Shoulder to shoulder forces the
enemy to attack more than one defender, those on both sides, and few directly
behind.
On 3
September 1260 The Mameluks Sultanate defeated the Mongols invasion of the Holy
Land at Ain Jalut. The Mameluks used
“Hand cannon” of Chinese origin in hopes of frightening Mongol horses with
unknown results. The shortage of grass
for Mongol horses limited the number of spare horses that limited the mobility
and flexibility of Mongol cavalry.
The old
adage of the enemy of my enemy is my friend caused considerable angst in the
remaining Crusader states. Some wanted
to have a treaty (MOU – memorandum of understanding) with the Mongols to finish
off the Muslims, but the Pope vetoed that notion. Instead, the Crusader states in harms’ way
gave free passage and watering holes for the Mameluks.
Eventually,
trade with the Far East introduced gunpowder and guns in sufficient amounts to
have an effect on fortifications and open battle, but that did not happen until
several decades after the end of the Crusades in the Levant. The
gradual introduction of more effective firearms into the hands of the
infantryman did not defeat the “close ranks” formations of the defenders until
the carnage of WW 1 tipped the balance.
These two battles, one in the American Revolution and the other at
Waterloo show close ordered formation not less tightly paced as a Greek
phalanx.
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This in
part was due to logistic reasons – no railroad. Until the railroad, armies marched on their stomachs
fed by forage, pillage, and/or plunder. Such
plundering alienated the civilians who were plundered even by their own troops
to the point that the Founders of the US Constitution made it a point in the
Bill of Rights in the Third Amendment:
“No
Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent
of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law”.
The Industrial
Revolution changed the tactical milieu not only by design of weaponry but upon
the ability to supply forward forces continuously. The range of technological
change came tin a rapidly increasing perhaps exponential rate during the 100
years before Armistice Day of the First World War.
Just before the
American Civil War, rifles replaced smooth bore muskets that tripled the
effective range of the infantryman against massed close order infantry. This
was a change from a fifty-yard lethal range to three hundred. The railroad increased the available
ammunition supply rate (ASR) The tactical imperative changed from “close
ranks” to “dig in, spread out, and hide”. It took another sixty years and
millions of lives until World War 2 before the lessons became standard
practice.
In addition to a
more lethal front line rifle, rifling added accuracy and range to cannon which
now could be fired from well behind the front line instead of being part of
it. The defense also shifted to field
fortifications (dug by the port-a-fort entrenching tool) to defeat incoming
bullets and escape both shell fragment and bullet swarm. The rate of fire of the infantryman increased
due to the now familiar brass cartridge and the action of loading new rounds
after extracting fired cartridges by hand by hand or automatically. Barbed wire
was introduced during the Great War from the Old West to slow down attackers in
the same manner as Caltrops were used in medieval war. Then we come to the
Second World War.
These
examples show that as the effective fire increases so are the defensive measure
on the receiving end. The mantra then
was close up, build up, and armor up.
The differences in mobility between the foot mounted infantry and the
horse-mounted cavalry still presents the problem of the cavalry outrunning the
infantry. This left gaps in the defensive line, or it slowed the attacker down
which turned the cavalry (horses, tanks, personnel carriers) into a slow
vulnerable target with no shock effect.
The defeat
of the Army of Jerusalem at the Horns of Hattin in 1187 featured a separation
of the infantry from the main force of mounted cavalry by reasons that are not
clear. Saladin had just completed
encircling the entire force, something that requires continuous pressure on the
defender from all sides (exterior lines) while the forces inside the circle
must defeat the forces on the circle one piece at a time before attacking
another piece. Interior lines require
space and speed.
The
remaining options for the Army of Jerusalem were to use heavy cavalry to break
through and escape. The advance guard
under Count Raymond III of Tripoli and the rear guard under Balian de Ibelin
both did just that. The fact remaining is that there was no infantry to support
the mounted charges by King Guy in his attack to break the Saracen lines and
reach water.
As the
battle developed, Jerusalem advanced across the slowly rising field with a row
of low rolling hills (the Horns of Hattin) with Raymond of Tripoli commanding
the advance guard, King Guy with the main body that had infantry protecting the
cavalry inside each “battle”.
Saladin then
chose the Tactical Imperatives of the Contra Attack to “confuse, blind, parried
and block” the Army of Jerusalem. Faced
with that, Jerusalem attempted to seize the high ground and break out towards
the Sea of Galilee (Tiberias). This charge disconnect the main body from it’s
own infantry, and both guards front and rear.
As the range
and lethality of weapons increased, so did the need to make some choices
between firepower, protection, and mobility.
These choices are complex, but there is a simple basis for analysis –
the human body. The choices can be
called “Tactical Imperatives”
Over the
centuries armies have attempted to close the speed difference between foot
mounted infantry and horse mounted cavalry.
One solution, then and now, is to for the infantry to ride to the battle
but fight on foot. That option is called
“mechanized infantry”,, Panzer Grenadier, Dragoons, and other storied names.
hic desinit lectio
